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THE INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW OF 
WEB APPLICATIONS AND CLOUD COMPUTING 
Sebastian Zimmeck† 
Abstract 
This article surveys and evaluates the privacy law of web 
applications and cloud computing. Cloud services, and web 
applications in particular, are subject to many different privacy law 
requirements. While these requirements are often perceived as ill-
fitting, they can be interpreted to provide a structurally sound and 
coherent privacy regime. The applicable body of law can be 
separated into two tiers: the primary privacy law and the secondary 
privacy law. The primary privacy law is created by the providers and 
users of cloud services through privacy contracts, especially, privacy 
policies. The secondary privacy law, contained, for example, in 
statutes and regulations, is for the most part only applicable where no 
valid privacy contracts exist. This supremacy of privacy contracts 
over statutory and other secondary privacy law enables 
individualized privacy protection levels and commercial use of 
privacy rights according to the contracting parties’ individual wishes. 
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This article surveys and evaluates the privacy law of web 
applications and cloud computing. The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology defines “cloud computing” as “a model for enabling 
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction.”1 Depending on which services are provided, three 
categories of cloud computing can be distinguished: software-as-a-
service (applications), platform-as-a-service (foundational elements to 
develop applications), and infrastructure-as-a-service (computational 
and storage infrastructure).2 Therefore, cloud computing services also 
cover web applications, such as webmail services, web search 
 
 1. PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE,  U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS AND TECH., SPECIAL PUB. NO. 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING 2 (2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-
145.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., Mache Creeger, Cloud Computing: An Overview, ACM QUEUE, June 1, 
2009, at 1, available at http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1554608. But see, e.g., Michael 
Armbrust et al., A View of Cloud Computing, 53 COMM. OF THE ACM no. 4, Apr. 2010, at 50, 
50, available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1721672&bnc=1 (“The line between ‘low-
level’ infrastructure and a higher-level ‘platform’ is not crisp. We believe the two are more alike 
than different, and we consider them together.”). 
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services, and social networks.3 They are subject to the same 
considerations as other cloud computing services and accordingly 
addressed in this article. 
The privacy law of cloud computing can be separated into two 
tiers. The primary privacy law is created by privacy contracts, while 
the secondary privacy law follows from constitutional privacy rights, 
common law rules, statutes, and regulations.4 By making use of 
privacy contracts, cloud service providers and users can shape their 
privacy relationship largely any way they want. Generally, they are 
subject to the secondary privacy law only to the extent they do not 
make use of privacy contracts. The reason for the supremacy of 
privacy contracts over the secondary privacy law is the 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of contract. Thus, for example, a 
valid provision in a privacy contract can be understood as a user’s 
consent to exclude an otherwise applicable privacy protection law.5 
The primary privacy law of cloud computing will be addressed in 
Part II. Part III will then describe the secondary privacy law. Lastly, 
Part IV will conclude with a few final remarks. 
II. PRIMARY PRIVACY LAW OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
From a formal perspective, a privacy contract binds only the 
contract parties.6 However, because court decisions and regulatory 
enforcement actions can establish precedents and approved practices, 
privacy contracts can become relevant for third parties as well. 
Generally, cloud service providers and users can agree to any privacy 
arrangement they want. Privacy contracts can be explicit or implicit 
and, in the area of cloud computing, will often take the form of 
 
 3. See, e.g., Muhammad Ali Babar & Muhammad Aufeef Chauhan, A Tale of Migration 
to Cloud Computing for Sharing Experiences and Observations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND 
INT’L WORKSHOP ON SOFTWARE ENG’G FOR CLOUD COMPUTING, May 2011, at 50, 50 (“[M]ost 
of the state-of-the-art social networking applications such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 
Flickr are reported to be based on high-performance cloud platforms . . . .”). 
 4. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1049 (2000) (discussing the contractual conception of information privacy law from a First 
Amendment perspective). See also Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: 
Eugene Volokh’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559 (2000) (responding to 
Eugene Volokh’s discussion of information privacy law). 
 5. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2) (2011). See also § 2702(b)(3), (c)(2). 
 6. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Personalization and Privacy, 43 COMM. OF THE ACM no. 
8, Aug. 2000, at 84, 86 (“Contracts, however, have one important limitation: They legally 
constrain only the parties to the contract.”). 
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service level agreements or be dependent on terms and conditions. 
The following section will discuss various aspects of privacy 
contracts between cloud service providers and users, in particular, 
contract formation, enforcement, and remedies. Thereafter, the next 
section will explore the extent to which privacy policies are equal to 
contracts, and how they can shape privacy relationships. 
A. Privacy Contracts 
Every enforceable contract requires valid contract formation,7 
which consists of an offer, acceptance, mutual assent, and 
consideration.8 In many cases contract formation on the web happens 
through clickwrap and browsewrap mechanisms. A cloud service 
provider using a clickwrap or browsewrap mechanism would display 
the contract terms on its website for the user to accept by clicking on 
a button or browsing the website, respectively. For both mechanisms 
valid contract formation often hinges on mutual assent. ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg addressed a clickwrap mechanism and found the click on 
a button before software could be used sufficient to indicate assent to 
the terms of the software license.9 Other courts presented with the 
issue followed ProCD and focused on whether the users had 
reasonable notice of the terms of the contracts in question.10 Different 
from a clickwrap mechanism, in case of a browsewrap mechanism the 
user’s assent to the cloud service provider’s contract offer depends on 
the mere use of the service.11 In this regard, some courts and 
commentators suggest that contract formation can be more easily 
 
 7. See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103, 
1136 (“Whether the written terms are binding as an agreement upon the parties depends on 
whether there was valid contract formation and no invalidating circumstances (such as 
unconscionability or duress).”). 
 8. Id. at 1124. 
 9. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A vendor, as master 
of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct . . . . A buyer may accept by performing the acts 
the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.”). See also U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2011) (“A contract 
for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct 
by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30-32, 35 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Feldman v. Google, Inc. 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236-238 (E.D. Pa. 2007); I. Lan Sys., Inc. v. 
Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 336 (D. Mass. 2002); Forrest v. Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010 (D.C. 2002). 
 11. Allyson W. Haynes, Web Site Visitors and Online Privacy: What Have You Agreed to 
Share?, 20 S.C. LAW., July 2008, at 27, 30, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=allyson_haynes. 
ZIMMECK 4/18/2013  1:27 AM 
2013] PRIVACY LAW OF CLOUD COMPUTING 455 
 
inferred for businesses than for consumers.12 
In Specht v. Netscape the court addressed mutual assent for 
browsewrap agreements and held that where consumers can download 
software at the click of a button, a reference to the existence of license 
terms on a submerged screen is insufficient to place consumers on 
notice of those terms.13 The court found that the download website 
screen was designed in such a manner that it tended to conceal the 
fact that it was an express acceptance of Netscape’s rules and 
regulations.14 In order to be bound to a browsewrap agreement and 
infer mutual assent many courts mandate that users must have actual 
or constructive knowledge of a service’s terms and conditions prior to 
using the service.15 Constructive knowledge requires that users are 
able to see the link to the terms and conditions without scrolling down 
to the bottom of the screen.16 
The question of when a link to terms and conditions is 
sufficiently designed to infer a user’s constructive knowledge is 
dependent on the individual circumstances of the case. One court 
found it sufficient that a website stated that “[b]y submitting 
[information] you agree to the Terms of Use” next to a blue hyperlink 
for access to those terms.17 Another court, however, noted that 
 
 12. See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“Moreover, the cases in which courts have enforced browsewrap agreements have involved 
users who are businesses rather than . . . consumers.”); Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to 
Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 
419 (2010) (describing that courts see businesses as more sophisticated than consumers when 
entering into online contracts); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 472 
(2006) (“An examination of the cases that have considered browsewraps in the last five years 
demonstrates that the courts have been willing to enforce terms of use against corporations, but 
have not been willing to do so against individuals.”). 
 13. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 32. See also Jennifer Femminella, Note, Online Terms and 
Conditions Agreements: Bound by the Web, 17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 87 (2003) 
(arguing that browsewrap agreements are unenforceable). But see Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 839. 
 14. Specht, 306 F.3d at 32 (citing Larrus v. First Nat’l Bank of San Mateo Cnty, 266 P.2d 
143, 147 (1954)). 
 15. See, e.g., Specht, 306 F.3d at 31; Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 
937 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 
WL 4823761, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007)); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 
362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Sw. Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *5); Sw. Airlines Co., 
2007 WL 4823761, at *5 (citing Lemley, supra note 12, at 477; Tarra Zynda, Note, 
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.: Preserving Minimum Requirements of Contract on the 
Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 495, 507 (2004)); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 
No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003). 
 16. Hines, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 367. 
 17. See Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 230-31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). See also 
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constructive knowledge is difficult to infer if a hyperlink to the terms 
appeared in small gray print on a gray background.18 Similarly, 
another court has declined to enforce terms and conditions that “only 
appear[ed] on [a] website via a link buried at the bottom of the first 
page.”19 In general, constructive knowledge can be inferred if the 
cloud service provider uses a conspicuous design for the link and 
provides access to the full terms and conditions upon clicking the 
link. 
In Maryland and Virginia clickwrap and browsewrap contract 
formation is governed by the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA),20 though formation under this statute is 
not materially different than in the other states. Under Maryland and 
Virginia law, mutual assent in case of clickwrap or browsewrap 
contract formation requires that a person has had an “opportunity to 
review” the terms and intentionally “engages in conduct or makes 
statements with reason to know that the other party . . . may infer 
from the conduct or statement that the person assents” to the terms of 
the contract.21 Individuals, however, are only deemed to have had an 
“opportunity to review” a contract term if it is “available in a manner 
that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit 
review.”22 
While contract formation generally requires mutual assent,23 
 
Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (citing Major, 302 S.W.3d at 229-31); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia 
Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 WL 756610, at *2, *5 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding 
sufficient that a website displayed the notice “By continuing past this page and/or using this site, 
you agree to abide by the Terms of Use . . . ,” with “Terms of Use” being an underlined and 
highlighted hyperlink leading to the actual terms). 
 18. Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
 19. Cvent, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d at 936–37 (E.D. Va. 2010). But see Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 
2d at 836 (citing Cvent, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d at 937–38); Koch Indus. v. Doe, No. 
2:10CV1275DAK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49529, at *21-26 (D. Utah May 9, 2011) (citing 
Cvent, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d at 936–37). 
 20. More specifically, UCITA “applies to computer information transactions.” MD. CODE 
ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW § 22-103(a) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.3(a) (West 
2012). 
 21. MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW § 22-112(a)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
501.12(a)(2). 
 22. MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW § 22-112(e)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
501.13:1(a). 
 23. See Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) (“[B]road 
statements of company policy do not generally give rise to contract claims.”) (citing Martens v. 
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Minn. 2000) (en banc); Pratt v. Heartview 
Found., 512 N.W.2d 675, 677 (N.D. 1994)); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126 
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promissory estoppel provides an exception to this principle based on 
detrimental reliance.24 Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a 
“promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and 
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”25 Such promise 
“is a contract, and full-scale enforcement under normal remedies is 
often appropriate.”26 Thus, for example, an enforceable contract can 
be created if a cloud service provider promises to not disclose 
information and users provide information in reliance on that 
promise.27 In such case promissory estoppel can be available, 
independent of mutual assent, to the extent the users “accessed, read, 
understood,” and “actually relied upon” the promise.28 
A particularly relevant defense against enforcement of privacy 
contracts is the doctrine of unconscionability, which is used to 
counter unfair or one-sided contracts.29 In most states, it has a 
procedural and a substantive component.30 The procedural component 
 
(PAM/JSM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10580, at *16-17 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (explaining that 
privacy policies are generally not contractual and that the policy at issue lacked definiteness, 
acceptance, and reliance, which are required for contract formation). 
 24. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 3 
(2011) (“Promises to protect privacy might be enforced through promissory estoppel.”). 
 25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981). 
 26. Id. § 90 cmt. d. 
 27. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 86 (“If the site says ‘We promise to keep your data 
private,’ and people act in reliance on that promise, that promise becomes a binding contract.”). 
See also RAYMOND T. NIMMER, 1 INFORMATION LAW § 8:79 (2012) (“Privacy rights between 
private parties can be created by contract or representations.”). 
 28. See Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. See also In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10580, at *14-17 (“Plaintiffs do not contend that they actually read the 
privacy policy prior to providing Northwest with their personal information.”). 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011); 
Daniel J. Gervais & Daniel J. Hyndman, Cloud Control: Copyright, Global Memes and Privacy, 
10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 53, 86 (2012) (discussing the “abuse of bargaining 
position that major Cloud service companies can try to exert over their users”); Allyson W. 
Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal Information?, 111 
PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 618-19 (2007); John Soma et al., Chasing the Clouds Without Getting 
Drenched: A Call for Fair Practices in Cloud Computing Services, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 193, 
211 (2011) (“Given their size and bargaining power, cloud services providers are in a position to 
dictate terms that are favorable to themselves, but risky for consumers.”). 
 30. See In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11–MD–02250–LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at 
*7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 
669, 690 (Cal. 2000)); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 239 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(citing Blake v. Ecker, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 433 (Ct. App. 2001)); Haynes, supra note 29, at 
619. 
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is satisfied by the existence of unequal bargaining positions or hidden 
terms.31 Thus, a contract or some of its terms may be procedurally 
unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion.32 “A contract of 
adhesion is a form or standardized contract prepared by a party of 
superior bargaining power, to be signed by the party in the weaker 
position, who only has the opportunity to agree to the contract or 
reject it, without an opportunity to negotiate or bargain.”33 This can be 
the case if cloud services are not interchangeable. For example, a user 
of a social network may be only able to connect to his or her friends 
on one particular network and, hence, be dependent on using it. If the 
substantive component would also be satisfied, that is, enforcing the 
contract would lead to “overly harsh or one-sided results that ‘shock 
the conscience,’”34 the doctrine of unconscionability would prevent 
such enforcement. 
Addressing damages, for breaches of privacy contracts, a proof 
of damages can be difficult. The loss of privacy as such is not a 
sufficient damage.35 Information does not constitute property and 
accordingly cannot be damaged.36 Personally identifiable information 
(PII) as such—for example, an individual name—does not have a 
compensable value.37 Receiving and disclosing information that is 
otherwise not public can, however, be a benefit and, thus, could 
arguably be subject to unjust enrichment.38 But in states where unjust 
enrichment is a quasi-contractual claim, plaintiffs may be barred from 
 
 31. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 2011 WL 4403963, at *7; Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 
2d at 239 (citing Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002)); Haynes, 
supra note 29, at 619. 
 32. See Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (citing Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 382 (Ct. App. 2001)); Haynes, supra note 29, at 619-20. 
 33. See Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (citing Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689). 
 34. See id. at 239 (quoting Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172). 
 35. See Trikas v. Universal Card Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 37, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 36. See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing 
Thompson v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 07cv1058 IEG (WMc), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68918, at 
*3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007)). 
 37. See Stayart v. Google Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057 (E.D. Wis. 2011); In re 
JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 38. See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 
2012); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 815 (N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Facebook 
Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d at 718; In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 
2d at 329-30; Class Action Complaint at 57, Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 
2012) (No. C08 03845 RS), 2008 WL 3886402, paras. 178-81. 
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making such a claim if they also make a contractual claim.39 In 
general, privacy remedies for personal wrongs are not easily 
accommodated within the existing legal regime.40 In this regard, it can 
be difficult to show damages for a violation of a privacy contract. 
B. Privacy Policies 
“Privacy policies are written statements of company practices 
with respect to the treatment of personal data of website visit[o]rs.”41 
If a user assents to or detrimentally relies on such a statement, a 
privacy policy can be a valid privacy contract. However, this is not 
always the case and depends on the individual circumstances.42 The 
policy must meet the requirements for contract formation and 
enforcement, as described in the previous section. Thus, if a privacy 
policy does not provide a mechanism for obtaining the user’s 
affirmative consent, which is usually the case, contract formation 
 
 39. See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1075-76 (citing McBride 
v. Boughton, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115, 122 (Ct. App. 2004)); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. 
Supp. 2d at 718 (citing Villager Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Dhami, Dhami & Virk, No. 
CVF046393RECSMS, 2006 WL 224425, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2006)). 
 40. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
877, 890-92 (2003). See generally M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 
1131, 1142-55 (2011) (describing “the outer boundaries and core properties of [a] privacy 
harm”). 
 41. Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
2041, 2043 n.6 (2000). See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CHILDREN’S PRIVACY 
UNDER COPPA: A SURVEY ON COMPLIANCE B-9 (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/coppasurvey.pdf (“A ‘Privacy Policy’ is defined as a 
comprehensive description of the site’s information practices—what the site does with the 
personal identifying information it collects from visitors to the site.”). 
 42. See generally In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126 (PAM/JSM), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10580, at *16-17 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (“The usual rule in contract cases is that 
‘general statements of policy are not contractual.’” (quoting Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. 
Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Minn. 2000) (en banc))); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 
2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) (explaining that “broad statements of company policy do not 
generally give rise to contract claims”) (citing Pratt v. Heartview Found., 512 N.W.2d 675, 677 
(N.D. 1994); Martens, 616 N.W.2d at 740); RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER 
TECHNOLOGY § 17:68 (2012) (“Despite the lack of a bilateral offer and acceptance, privacy 
policies may become part of a contractual arrangement . . . .”); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 24, at 3 (“Confidentiality or other privacy protections can be an express or implied 
contractual term in a relationship.”); Haynes, supra note 29, at 613-18 (viewing the enforcement 
of privacy policies as contract enforcement); Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: 
Privacy Policies in Principle and in Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 91-92 (1999) (discussing 
the categorization of privacy policies as contracts); Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. 
O’Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HOUS. L. 
REV. 777, 795-803 (2001) (discussing the categorization of privacy policies as contracts). 
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rests on the principles developed for browsewrap contracts. If the 
browsewrap mechanism is sufficient, a privacy policy is a contract.43 
Therefore, privacy policies cannot be qualified as contracts solely 
based on their nature as privacy policies, but rather such qualification 
is dependent on the application of ordinary contract law principles. 
However, as the contract formation requirements of browsewrap 
agreements are very similar to the Federal Trade Commission’s 
(FTC’s) “clear and prominent notice” standard for posting privacy 
policies,44 every privacy policy that complies with the FTC standard 
is also a contract. Thus, in practice, the vast majority of privacy 
policies are privacy contracts. 
Generally, cloud service providers can decide whether or not 
they want to adopt a privacy policy.45 However, there are certain 
exceptions that obligate them to have one. At the federal level, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) requires a privacy 
policy if a service is directed to children or its provider knowingly 
collects children’s personal information.46 If a provider wants to 
collect, use, or disclose children’s personal information, it must also 
obtain verifiable parental consent.47 At the state level, California’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA) requires service providers to 
have a privacy policy if they collect PII from and about consumers 
 
 43. While not every privacy policy is a contract, every written privacy contract can be 
understood as a privacy policy. After all, such contracts are statements regarding a service 
provider’s practices about the treatment of personal data. See NIMMER, supra note 42, § 17:68 
(“Beyond contract analyses, online privacy statements may be regarded as statements about how 
the provider does business.”). 
 44. The FTC standard consists of “placing a clear and prominent hyperlink or button 
labeled PRIVACY NOTICE or PRIVACY POLICY on [the] home page, and at each location on 
the site at which personal identifying information is collected, which directly links to the privacy 
notice screen(s) containing the required information.” See Stipulated Consent Agreement and 
Final Order, FTC v. Rapp, No. 99-WM-783 (D. Col. June 23, 2000); Stipulated Consent 
Agreement and Final Order, FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., No. 1:00-cv-0032 (D.D.C. Jan. 
10, 2000). 
 45. See NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 8:79 (“[T]here is no nationally applicable law of 
general application that requires the creation of privacy policies in the U.S. . . . .”). See also 
Hetcher, supra note 41, at 2055-56 (“[I]n principle, [the FTC] could bring enforcement actions 
against websites merely on the basis of ‘unfair’ practices.”). 
 46. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i) (2011); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.3(a), 312.4(b) (2012). 
Although further federal laws require providers of certain services to give notice of their privacy 
practices, those same federal laws do not mandate that service providers post a privacy policy on 
their website. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6803, 16 C.F.R. pt. 313 (applying to financial institutions); 
45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (applying to health care providers and other covered entities). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.3(b), 312.5. 
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residing in California.48 Furthermore, some state statues mandate a 
privacy policy for service providers that collect social security 
numbers.49 If service providers voluntarily decide to have a privacy 
policy or are required to have one, they must only describe what they 
do with the PII of their users.50 Information that is not PII does not 
need to be covered in privacy policies.51 The FTC defines PII to mean 
“individually identifiable information from or about an individual 
consumer,” such as a name, an email address, or an Internet protocol 
(IP) address.52 Similar definitions are contained in COPPA and 
OPPA.53 
Sometimes information is only identifying in certain instances. 
For example, depending on their content, sometimes search queries 
identify a particular person, while sometimes they do not.54 
Furthermore, a piece of information may only be identifying if it is 
aggregated with other information. Thus, while a single search query 
may not identify a particular person, an aggregation of many search 
queries may reveal habits, interests, and much more about an 
individual finally identifying it. Given these characteristics, it is 
debated whether search queries are PII or non-PII.55 A similar 
 
 48. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575(a) (West 2012). 
 49. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.84 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
42-471(b) (West 2012). 
 50. For a new concept of PII, see Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: 
Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 
(2011). See also Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure 
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (arguing for abandoning the concept of PII 
altogether). 
 51. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 50, at 1816 (“Information that falls within th[e] 
category [of PII] is protected, and information outside of it is not.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Decision and Order, In re Eli Lilly & Co., FTC Docket No. C-4047 (May 8, 
2002). See also Decision and Order, In re Google Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4336, at 3 (Oct. 13, 
2011) (defining “[c]overed information”); Decision and Order, In re of ACRAnet, Inc., FTC 
Docket No. C-4331, at 2 (Aug. 17, 2011) (defining “[p]ersonal information”); Decision and 
Order, In re Superior Mortg. Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4153, at 2 (Dec. 14, 2005) (defining 
“[p]ersonal information”); Decision and Order, In re Guess?, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4091, at 2 
(July 30, 2003) (defining “[p]ersonal information”); Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, 
FTC v. Prophet 3H, Inc., No. 06 CV 1692, at 6-7 (N.D. Ga. July 18, 2006) (defining 
“‘[p]ersonally identifiable information’ or ‘identity information’”). 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (2011); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22577(a). 
 54. See Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1450 (2008) (“Depending on their intended uses, search-query logs may 
raise serious privacy problems.”). 
 55. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 50, at 1847-48 (arguing that the question of 
whether search queries are PII cannot be answered in the abstract). 
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question arises with regard to IP addresses.56 Thus, it could be argued 
that certain types of information simply cannot be categorized as 
either PII or non-PII. However, the concept of PII inherently accounts 
for the uncertainty of the identification of an individual. Information 
is categorized as PII if it makes an individual identifiable, that is, 
there is a possibility of identifying the individual. It is not necessary 
that the individual is actually identified. In this regard, search queries 
and IP addresses are not different from names or postal addresses, 
which also do not necessarily identify an individual. Thus, 
information is PII if it is possible, perhaps together with other 
information, to identify a particular individual. 
Privacy policies only need to describe privacy practices where 
PII is collected from and about an individual. This point is made 
expressly clear in OPPA’s definition of PII which states that “[t]he 
term ‘personally identifiable information’ means individually 
identifiable information about an individual consumer collected 
online by the operator from that individual . . . .”57 Similarly, it also 
follows from COPPA’s definition of personal information as 
“individually identifiable information about an individual”58 in 
combination with its prohibition to “collect personal information from 
a child.”59 Thus, obtaining PII about an individual from a third party 
does not create a privacy policy obligation vis-à-vis the individual. 
Rather, the individual released the information to the third party at his 
or her own risk, though the third party may have had an obligation to 
adopt a privacy policy and describe its information disclosure 
 
 56. See, e.g., VPR Internationale v. Does 1-1017, No. 11-2068, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
64656, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011) (noting the difficulty of correlating IP addresses to 
individual persons); Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., No. C06-0900RAJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58174, at *12-13 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2009) (holding that an IP address is not PII because it 
identifies a particular computer instead of an individual person); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. 
Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419, at *3 n.10 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) 
(expressing doubt that an IP address can be PII because it identifies a particular computer 
instead of an individual person); Klimas v Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc., No. 02-CV-72054-
DT, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27765, at *10 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2003) (holding that a dynamic IP 
address is not PII because it can be assigned to different persons), aff’d on other grounds, 465 
F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2006); Ben G. Isaacson, Integrating Non-Personal Web Behavior with 
Personal Information, 970 PLI/PAT 593, 599 (2009) (arguing that IP addresses cannot be 
considered personal information unless correlated with offline personal information); Tene, 
supra note 54, at 1446 (“The answer depends on whether the address might be linked to a 
specific individual through reasonable means.”). 
 57. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22577(a) (emphasis added). 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8). 
 59. Id. § 6502(a)(1). 
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practices.60 The requirement that information must be collected from 
and about an individual excludes a lot of information from being PII. 
For example, information about an individual posted on a social 
network by a third party is not PII of that individual. 
If cloud service providers are required or voluntarily decide to 
have a privacy policy, the FTC Act generally allows them to 
determine what they want do with collected PII.61 As long as they 
give sufficient notice thereof, they are generally free to treat the 
information any way they want.62 Thus, to a large extent, the FTC’s 
privacy policy enforcement focuses on the providers’ compliance 
with the terms of their own privacy policies. If PII is collected, the 
FTC requires cloud service providers to adhere to their 
representations about information collection,63 disclosure,64 use,65 and 
management.66 Not providing a sufficient privacy policy can 
constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting 
 
 60. As the FTC definition of PII refers to information “from or about an individual,” 
supra, note 52, it is not sound and should not be applied to that extent. 
 61. See Haynes, supra note 11, at 29 (“[T]he focus of FTC and state enforcement is 
primarily on the Web site’s adherence to its promises, not a general standard of fairness.”). 
 62. Id.; Haynes, supra note 29, at 588. 
 63. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, In re ScanScout, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4344 (Dec. 14, 
2011) (alleging misrepresentation that consumers could opt out from receiving cookies thereby 
preventing information collection); Complaint at 5, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., FTC 
Docket No. C-4264 (Aug. 31, 2009) (alleging misrepresentation about the extent to which a 
client-side application collects and transmits information); Complaint at 3, In re Microsoft 
Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4069 (Dec. 20, 2002) (alleging misrepresentation that no PII is 
collected). 
 64. See, e.g., Complaint at 5-6, In re Myspace LLC, FTC Docket No. C-4369 (Aug. 30, 
2012) (alleging misrepresentation about disclosure of user profiles and other PII); Complaint at 
2-3, In re Vision I Properties, LLC, FTC Docket No. C-4135 (Apr. 19, 2005) (alleging 
misrepresentation about disclosure of shopping information and other PII); Complaint, In re Eli 
Lilly & Co., FTC Docket No. C-4047 (May 8, 2002) (alleging misrepresentation about 
disclosure of email addresses). 
 65. See, e.g., Complaint at 5, In re Google Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011) 
(alleging misrepresentation by claiming that user information would be only used for webmail 
purposes, while it was also used to populate social network); Complaint, In re GeoCities, FTC 
Docket No. C-3850 (Feb. 5, 1999) (alleging misrepresentation by claiming that user information 
would only be used for the purpose of providing specific email advertising and other requested 
offers, while it was also used for other marketing purposes). 
 66. See, e.g., Complaint at 6-7, In re Facebook, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4365 (July 27, 
2012) (alleging misrepresentation that users could restrict third parties’ access to their profile 
information); Complaint at 5, In re Upromise, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4351 (Mar. 27, 2012) 
(alleging misrepresentation that the toolbar would transmit information in an encrypted format); 
Complaint at 4, In re Guess?, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4091 (July 30, 2003) (alleging 
misrepresentation that information is stored in an encrypted format). 
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commerce according to 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) and may also be subject 
to state unfair competition laws. It can also be false advertisement 
according to 15 U.S.C. § 52.67 Further, the FTC views the providers’ 
failure to abide by self-regulatory programs they joined as violation of 
15 U.S.C. § 45.68 
Some state statues go beyond the FTC Act. Particularly, OPPA 
contains some detailed requirements for privacy policies. It mandates 
provision of a description of any available process for reviewing and 
requesting changes to any PII that is collected as well as of the 
process by which the provider notifies users of material changes to 
the privacy policy.69 Therefore, to the extent that California residents 
are not excluded from a service, OPPA is the true measure of when 
and how to implement a privacy policy.70 More generally, cloud 
service providers with a single nationally applicable privacy policy 
must default to the more stringent state law requirements. In this 
regard, the state law with the most stringent requirements will set the 
standard. If cloud service providers want to avoid such standard, they 
would need to provide state-specific privacy policies or even 
implement state-specific versions of their services. 
 
 67. See generally Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining 
Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 816-
17 (2011) (discussing that the main sources of FTC enforcement are 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 and 52). 
 68. See, e.g., Complaint for Civil Penalties and Other Relief at 11-12, United States v. 
Google Inc., No. CV 12-04177 HRL (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012) (alleging misrepresentation by 
not disclosing the information collection and use practices contrary to a self-regulatory 
program). See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 14, 73 (2012), 
available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (“The Commission will also 
continue to enforce the FTC Act to take action against companies that engage in unfair or 
deceptive practices, including the failure to abide by self-regulatory programs they join.”); 
Laura J. Bowman, Pulling Back the Curtain: Online Consumer Tracking, 7 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 718, 737-38 (2012). Compliance with COPPA regulations will be assumed if 
the operator complies with self-regulatory guidelines approved by the FTC according to 16 
C.F.R. § 312.11 (2012). 
 69. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(b)(2)-(3) (West 2012). 
 70. See Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868, 
895 (2009) (“The standard becomes a national, though not a federally adopted, standard, and it 
may create externalities even if no other state adopts a conflicting rule.”); Isaacson, supra note 
56, at 600 (“Also, because most websites do not exclude California residents from transacting or 
registering online, the law serves as a de facto requirement for all online marketers who collect 
personal information.”); Sarah B. Kemble, Privacy Policies: Is There Really a Choice 
Anymore?, 16 S.C. LAW. 26, 28 (2004) (“Because the geographical location of the operator is 
irrelevant, for all practical purposes the OPPA has the scope and impact of a federal privacy 
law.”). 
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III. SECONDARY PRIVACY LAW OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
If cloud service providers and users do not enter into valid 
privacy contracts, secondary privacy law will apply as the default. 
Further, even if valid privacy contracts exist, some of the secondary 
privacy law remains applicable.71 While comprehensive federal 
legislation would be possible, especially, because the Internet can be 
categorized as a channel or an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce,72 the secondary privacy law is actually characterized by 
narrow laws targeted to protect privacy in certain limited areas.73 As 
shown in Figure 1, privacy-relevant actions in the relationship 
between a cloud service provider and a user are the collection, 
disclosure, use, and management of information.74 All of these actions 
are subject to unfair competition statutes, however, are also governed 
by more specific laws. In the following sections, the applicable 
secondary privacy law will be discussed for each action.75 
  
 
 71. One example is the rules on information management. See infra Part III.D. 
 72. See, e.g., United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)) (holding that the 
Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce); United States v. Hornaday, 
392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 256 (1964); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925)) (“Congress clearly 
has the power to regulate the internet, as it does other instrumentalities and channels of interstate 
commerce . . . .”); United States v. Penton, 380 F. App’x. 818, 820 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Hornaday, 392 F.3d at 1311) (holding that the Internet is an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce). 
 73. Unlike the United States, many other countries enacted comprehensive privacy laws. 
For example, Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act regulates 
the collection, use, and transfer of personal information by private organizations. See S.C. 2011, 
c. 5 (Can.). Likewise, Germany’s Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (Federal Data Protection Act) 
covers the collection, processing, and use of PII by the government and private persons. See 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 14, 2003, BGBL. I at 66 (Ger.). 
 74. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490 
fig.1 (2006) (providing an illustrative figure for the collection, processing, and dissemination of 
information as well as the invasions of privacy). 
 75. It is assumed that cloud service providers are private entities. In case of governmental 
cloud service providers or private providers acting as agents of the government, users would 
also have constitutional privacy rights against the providers. See generally Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 
(1984)) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies if a private party acted as an instrument or 
agent of the government). 
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A. Information Collection 
Information collection means to obtain and store information 
from and about an individual. In order to collect information cloud 
service providers often access users’ computers or install software on 
them, such as cookies, virtual machines, or browser extensions. These 
acts could allegedly violate the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA)76—particularly, 18 U.S.C. § 2701.77 This provision penalizes 
the intentional accessing of an electronic communication facility 
without authorization or in excess of authorization and thereby 
obtaining, altering, or preventing authorized access to a wire or 
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.78 Some 
court decisions seem to argue that an individual user’s computer is a 
“facility” and, thus, subject to 18 U.S.C. § 2701.79 However, such 
application would be misguided.80 First, the provision contains an 
exception for conduct authorized by the providers of wire or 
 
 76. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2011). 
 77. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 41, Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (No. C08 03845 RS), 2008 WL 3886402, para. 115. 
 78. See § 2701(a). 
 79. See, e.g., Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160-61 (W.D. Wash. 2001) 
(concluding that it is possible to view users’ computers as facilities protected by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2701); In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (illustrating 
that a “‘hacker’ who accesses data in a computer without the owner’s knowledge would be 
guilty of violating Section 2701”); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 
508 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that accessing the communications of users to affiliated third 
parties can satisfy a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2701); Expert Janitorial, LLC v. Williams, No. 
3:09-CV-283, 2010 WL 908740, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2010) (holding that unauthorized 
accessing of information on a computer can satisfy a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2701). 
 80. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1057-58 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(explaining that the decisions cited by plaintiff for the proposition that computers are “facilities” 
provide little insight because they assume this to be true and ultimately rule on other grounds). 
Cloud Service 
Provider 








ZIMMECK 4/18/2013  1:27 AM 
2013] PRIVACY LAW OF CLOUD COMPUTING 467 
 
electronic communications services.81 Thus, if users’ computers were 
covered by 18 U.S.C. § 2701, such providers would be authorized to 
grant third parties’ access to users’ computers, which would be an 
unusual result.82 Therefore, a user’s computer is not a “facility.”83 
Second, according to 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a), the SCA prohibits 
obtaining, altering, or preventing authorized access with regard to 
communication in electronic storage, that is, communication in 
“temporary, intermediate storage” or “storage . . . for purposes of 
backup protection.”84 However, if only one copy of a communication 
exists—for example, one copy of an email on a user’s hard drive—it 
is not covered because it is neither in temporary nor in backup 
storage. For the same reasons a permanently installed single software 
copy on a user’s hard drive, such as a cookie, is not covered either.85 
Consequently, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 does not prohibit a cloud service 
provider from accessing a user’s computer or installing software 
thereon. 
However, cloud service providers are indeed subject to the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030.86 The 
CFAA essentially requires a provider to obtain the user’s consent 
before installing any software on the user’s computer.87 Not obtaining 
consent can result in the provider’s liability. Numerous states have 
spyware statutes comparable to the CFAA.88 Therefore, as in the case 
of privacy policies,89 cloud service providers must use a state-specific 
 
 81. See § 2701(c)(1). 
 82. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 (citing Crowley v. 
CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270-71 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). 
 83. Id.; Crowley, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1271; Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 
1214-15 (2004). 
 84. § 2510(17). 
 85. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1058-59 (citing In re 
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 511; In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., 
No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001)). 
 86. See generally In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 520 (assuming 
that plaintiffs’ computers were protected under the CFAA). 
 87. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2011). See also In re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., 
No. C 07-05152 JW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98270, at *26-27 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2010) (holding 
that voluntary installation of software does not satisfy the requirement that the alleged act must 
be “without authorization” to be actionable under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)). 
 88. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 123-24 (providing a comprehensive 
overview of state spyware statutes). 
 89. See supra Part II.B. 
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approach or accept the most restrictive state statute as setting the bar 
for compliance with spyware statutes.90 However, civil actions under 
the CFAA are limited to certain enumerated circumstances.91 In this 
regard, particularly, the $5,000 statutory minimum damages threshold 
has proven to be difficult to overcome for plaintiffs.92 In addition to 
the CFAA and state spyware statutes, accessing of and installing 
software on a user’s computer can be actionable under tort law as 
trespass to chattels.93 If the user is not deprived from using the 
computer for a substantial time, however, the computer must be 
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value for trespass to chattels to 
apply.94 Therefore, an action for trespass to chattels is generally 
limited to situations where the trespass actually did, or threatened to, 
interfere with the intended functioning of the computer, as by 
significantly reducing its available memory or processing power.95 
For accessing a user’s computer, installing software, and storing 
user information on a cloud service provider’s server the intrusion 
upon seclusion tort must be considered as well.96 In most states an 
intrusion does not have to be of a physically defined place, but can be 
of a person’s personality or inner sphere.97 However, the scope of 
intrusion upon seclusion is rather narrow because, as in any 
 
 90. Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: The Limitations of State “Laboratories” and 
the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1363, 1411 (2005). 
 91. § 1030(g), (c)(4)(A)(i). 
 92. § 1030(g), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I). See generally Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 
1153, 1158-59 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280-81 
(C.D. Cal. 2001); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 520-26 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 216-222 (1965). For an argument of 
modernizing information privacy law by a unitary tort for invasion of privacy see Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007 (2010). 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965). 
 95. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(citing Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1356 (2003)). See also In re Apple & ATTM 
Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05152 JW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98270, at *26-27 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 
2010) (voluntarily installed software eliminates a claim for trespass to chattels); Ticketmaster 
Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 7, 2003) (holding that in the case of web crawling there must be some evidence that the use 
or utility of the affected computer is diminished thereby). 
 96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 97. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983) (“One’s 
emotional sanctum is certainly due the same expectations of privacy as one’s physical 
environment.”). 
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intentional tort, such claim can be defeated by consent, including 
consent that was improperly induced.98 Thus, a court may be 
concerned with the scope of the consent and the extent to which a 
limited consent was exceeded.99 In addition, the “highly offensive” 
requirement further narrows the tort’s scope of application.100 
Therefore, in most cases the collection of information, such as names, 
addresses, social security numbers, purchasing, and financial 
transaction histories, will not be covered by this tort.101 
B. Information Disclosure 
Information disclosure means the forwarding of collected 
information from one party to another. Generally, cloud service 
providers are permitted to disclose information to whomever and in 
whatever way they want.102 This right to disclose information is based 
on the First Amendment and also statutorily protected by the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230.103 However, 
the right is subject to restrictions.104 Its limits depend on whether the 
 
 98. See, e.g., Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 (D. Kan. 1998) (citing Baugh 
v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1993)); Baugh, 828 F. Supp. at 757 (citing 
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972)); Steven Perry, Hidden Cameras, New Technology, and 
the Law, 14 COMM. LAW. 1, 21 (1996). 
 99. See Perry, supra note 98, at 21. 
 100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). See, e.g., Boring v. Google Inc., 
362 F. App’x. 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2010) (intruding upon the external view of the plaintiffs’ 
premises cannot be considered highly offensive). 
 101. Candice L. Kline, Comment, Security Theater and Database-Driven Information 
Markets: A Case for an Omnibus U.S. Data Privacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 463 
(2008). 
 102. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (finding a Vermont law 
that generally prohibited disclosure and use of pharmacy records for marketing and promotion 
of prescription drugs an unconstitutional restriction of free speech); James Grimmelmann, The 
Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2007) (arguing that a search engine 
is free to disclose collected information); Haynes, supra note 29, at 597 (“No law prevents a 
website operator from sharing or selling personal information it has lawfully been given . . . .”). 
 103. See generally Stayart v. Google Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1056 (E.D. Wis. 2011) 
(“The Communications Decency Act . . . effectively immunizes search engines like Yahoo and 
Google from claims that they displayed information created by third parties which presents an 
individual in an unfavorable light.”), aff’d, No. 11-3012, 2013 WL 811793 (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 
2013); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27193, at *11-12 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (ranking a website as displayed on a search results 
page is constitutionally protected speech). But see Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 
785, 801-03 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that Facebook is not entitled to CDA immunity because 
it also provides its own content to users). 
 104. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(analyzing whether Rules 26(b) and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure support a 
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cloud service provider discloses information to private parties or the 
government. The latter is much more restricted due to constitutional 
privacy rights of the user about whom information is disclosed. The 
following discussion will first describe the disclosure to private 
parties and then address disclosure to the government. 
1. Disclosure to Private Parties 
The most relevant provision for disclosure of information by 
cloud service providers to private parties is 18 U.S.C. § 2702. 
However, for the provision to be applicable an “electronic 
communication service” or “remote computing service” is required.105 
An “electronic communication service” is defined as “any service 
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or 
electronic communications.”106 In order to fall under this definition a 
cloud service provider must be “in the business of providing 
electronic communication services.”107 In other words, it must be the 
main purpose of the service to deliver electronic communications.108 
Examples of electronic communication services are webmail 
services,109 social network services,110 electronic bulletin board 
 
subpoena requesting search query text). 
 105. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2011). 
 106. Id. § 2510(15). 
 107. In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 518, 523-24 (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
(citing In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (D.N.D. 2004)). See also Andersen 
Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that a licensor and 
supplier of petroleum refining, petrochemical, and gas processing technologies “is not in the 
business of providing electronic communication services”). 
 108. In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d at 523-34. See also In re 
JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (holding that companies that 
provide traditional products and services over the Internet are not electronic communication 
service providers); Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(holding that an online merchant was not an electronic communication service provider even 
though it provides a platform for electronic communications in connection with its sales). 
 109. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); Crispin v. 
Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that webmail and 
social network services are electronic communication services); United States v. Weaver, 636 F. 
Supp. 2d 769, 770 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that a webmail service is both an electronic 
communication service as well as remote computing service); Derek Constantine, Comment, 
Cloud Computing: The Next Great Technological Innovation, the Death of Online Privacy, or 
Both?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 523 (2012) (arguing that webmail services should be 
categorized as electronic communication services). 
 110. See, e.g., Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (holding that webmail and social network 
services are electronic communication services). 
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services,111 and computer reservation system services.112 According to 
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1), providers of such services to the public are 
not allowed to disclose the contents of communications while in 
electronic storage. In this regard, the application of the provision 
often hinges on determining when communications are in “electronic 
storage.” 
“Electronic storage”, as defined in the Wiretap Act113 and 
applicable to the SCA, is “any temporary, intermediate storage of a 
wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic 
transmission thereof; and any storage of such communication by an 
electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection 
of such communication.”114 This twofold definition is somewhat 
limited. On the one hand, “temporary, intermediate storage” only 
covers communications not yet made available to the intended 
recipient.115 On the other hand, storage “for purposes of backup 
protection” does not apply if only one copy of a communication 
exists.116 Thus, for example, a webmail service ceases to provide 
electronic storage with regard to a particular email message upon the 
user’s opening of this message.117 However, if information is not or 
no longer in electronic storage, 18 U.S.C. § 2702 would remain 
applicable if the cloud service can be characterized as a remote 
computing service. 
A “remote computing service” is defined as “the provision to the 
public of computer storage or processing services by means of an 
electronic communications system.”118 Depending on the specific 
service, cloud services can qualify as remote computing services.119 
 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003); Konop v. 
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 112. United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2011). 
 114. Id. § 2510(17). 
 115. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing In re 
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)); Crispin, 717 F. 
Supp. 2d at 983 (citing Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075). 
 116. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (holding 
that the storage of emails through a webmail service does not qualify as backup protection). 
 117. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (citing Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 772). 
 118. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). 
 119. See Matthew A. Goldberg, Comment, The Googling of Online Privacy: Gmail, 
Search-Engine Histories and the New Frontier of Protecting Private Information on the Web, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 249, 272 (2005) (arguing that a search engine is a remote computing 
service). But see Matthew Werner, Comment, Google and Ye Shall Be Found: Privacy, Search 
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For example, courts found that publicly available webmail services,120 
video sharing services,121 and social networks are remote computing 
services.122 Thus, they are generally prohibited from disclosing 
communication contents. However, the prohibition may not always 
apply. The reason is that 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B) requires that the 
communication be transmitted to the service provider “solely for the 
purpose of providing storage or computer processing services” and 
that service providers must “not [be] authorized to access the contents 
of any such communications for purposes of providing any services 
other than storage or computer processing.” Therefore, while many 
cloud services purposefully provide storage or computer processing 
services, if the service provider and the user agreed that the provider 
can access the communication contents of users, for example, for 
purposes of contextual advertising, such contents can be disclosed.123 
So far it follows from the SCA that covered cloud service 
providers are generally not permitted to disclose the contents of 
communication.124 The SCA, however, does not prohibit the 
disclosure of “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber 
to or customer of such service (not including the contents of 
communications . . .) . . . to any person other than a governmental 
entity.”125 Thus, the law distinguishes between contents of 
communications and noncontent information.126 To determine 
whether a cloud service provider is prohibited from disclosing to 
private parties information, such as search histories, one must decide 
if this information constitutes contents of communications.127 The 
 
Queries, and the Recognition of a Qualified Privilege, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
273, 295 (2007) (arguing that a search engine is not a remote computing service). 
 120. See, e.g., Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (holding that a webmail service is both an 
electronic communication service as well as remote computing service). 
 121. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 122. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987, 990 (holding that a social network is a remote 
computing service with respect to opened and retained private messages as well as public wall 
postings and comments). 
 123. William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy under 
the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1213-14 (2010). See also Ilana R. Kattan, 
Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act Fails to Protect the 
Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 640 (2011). 
 124. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1), (2) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 125. Id. § 2702(c)(6) (emphasis added). 
 126. Goldberg, supra note 119, at 262-67. 
 127. Jayni Foley, Note, Are Google Searches Private? An Originalist Interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment in Online Communication Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 447, 458 (2007); 
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“contents” definition of the Wiretap Act, which is applicable to the 
SCA, provides that “‘contents’, when used with respect to any wire, 
oral, or electronic communication, includes any information 
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.”128 Thus, whether information is contents of a 
communication is generally dependent on whether it is part of the 
substantive message that a person wishes to communicate or only 
delivery or processing information.129 
In some instances, cloud service providers that offer electronic 
communication or remote computing services to the public are also 
permitted to disclose the contents of communications.130 First, 
obviously, a cloud service provider is permitted to disclose 
communication contents to an addressee or intended recipient of the 
communication.131 Second, the provider may also disclose the 
contents of a communication with the lawful consent of an addressee 
or intended recipient.132 In combination, these two exceptions have an 
important implication, that is, they make the redirection of a user 
client to a third party server lawful under the SCA. As shown in 
Figure 2, (1) if a user enters a cloud service’s web address, (2) the 
requested website will be returned, (3) but in addition the user client 
is also redirected and discloses information to a third party server, (4) 
which sends back a frame for display on the requested website. The 
disclosure of information to the third party server is compliant with 
the SCA because either the cloud service provider is an addressee or 
intended recipient of the communication consenting to the disclosure 
to the third party, or the third party itself is an addressee or intended 
recipient. Therefore, for example, the redirection of a user client to an 
ad server is not a disclosure of communication contents under the 
 
Goldberg, supra note 119, at 262. 
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
 129. See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp 2d 1040, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (citing United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 916 (9th Cir. 2009)) (holding that contents of 
communication refers to information the user intended to communicate); Matthew J. Tokson, 
The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2105 (2009) 
(proposing that information that can reveal the text or subject matter of a communication should 
be categorized as contents). See generally Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA 
Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 611-16 (2003) (giving an 
overview on distinguishing content from noncontent in letters, phone calls, emails, and Internet 
packets). 
 130. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b). 
 131. See id. § 2702(b)(1). 
 132. See id. § 2702(b)(3). 
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For a similar reason a user would also have no claim under the 
Wiretap Act, which prohibits electronic communication service 
providers from disclosing the “contents of any communication (other 
than one to such person or entity . . .) . . . to any person or entity other 
than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication.”134 
This is because the communication was either from the user to the 
cloud service provider, in which case it was a communication “to 
such person or entity,” or from the user to the third party, in which 
case the third party was an “addressee or intended recipient.”135 In 
addition, while the redirection of a user client can be a willful 
interception by the third party and a procurement to intercept by the 
cloud service provider according to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1),136 the 
interception will be lawful in most cases. Absent a criminal or tortious 
act, an interception is lawful if performed by a party to the 
communication or with the consent of one of the parties.137 In the case 
 
 133. See, e.g., In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713-14 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (“Plaintiffs . . . allege that the communications at issue were sent to Defendant or to 
advertisers. Under either interpretation, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Stored 
Communications Act.”). 
 134. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a). 
 135. See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d at 712-13. 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen the 
contents of a wire communication are captured or redirected in any way, an interception occurs 
at that time.”). 
 137. § 2511(2)(d); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1162 (W.D. Wash. 2001) 
(“One-party consent is sufficient to negate liability under the consent prong of the Wiretap Act’s 
exception.”) (citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750 (1979)); In re DoubleClick Inc. 
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[W]e find that the DoubleClick-
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Redirection
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of a redirection, either the third party was a party to the 
communication or the cloud service provider was a party and 
consented to the redirection.138 Moreover, it is also required that the 
alleged interception amounts to a “criminal” or “tortious” act, and in 
most instances this will not be the case.139 These terms are construed 
narrowly, covering only acts accompanied by a specific 
contemporaneous intention to commit a crime or tort.140 Particularly, 
purely commercial purposes are not sufficient for tortious acts and 
purely commercial intents do not constitute tortious intents.141 
Beyond the SCA and the Wiretap Act, the disclosure of 
information to private parties is also subject to various torts. It can 
satisfy the elements of appropriation of name or likeness,142 public 
disclosure of private facts,143 and false light.144 However, for the two 
latter torts, the “highly offensive” requirement reduces the torts’ 
scope of application substantially. Appropriation also has a narrow 
scope. For example, while it is suggested that collecting and 
disclosing an extensive consumer profile without consumer consent 
should be actionable as appropriation,145 it is not enough to display a 
consumer’s name on a search result page.146 In addition, cloud service 
providers are also subject to breach of confidentiality.147 In this 
regard, one commentator argues for recognition of a discovery 
privilege for search queries.148 Further, a deprivation of use of 
 
sufficient consent to DoubleClick to intercept them.” (second alteration in original)). 
 138. Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (holding that the websites that the user contacted 
had consented to Avenue A’s interception of the communication between them and the user). 
 139. See § 2511(2)(d). 
 140. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 515. 
 141. See id. (concluding that defendant’s commercial motivations negate tortious intent). 
 142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 
F. Supp. 2d 785, 803-810 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying Facebook’s motion to dismiss a claim of 
commercial misappropriation under California Civil Code Section 3344). 
 143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 144. See id. § 652E. 
 145. Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort 
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2003). 
 146. Stayart v. Google Inc., 783 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1057 (E.D. Wis. 2011). 
 147. See Tene, supra note 54, at 1486-90 (arguing that search engine providers are subject 
to the law of confidentiality). See generally SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 73 
(comparing the torts of public disclosure of private facts and breach of confidentiality); Susan 
M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing whether breach of confidence is an effective instrument for 
privacy protection). 
 148. See Werner, supra note 119, at 274. 
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personal information for a substantial period of time is arguably 
actionable as trespass to chattels.149 However, the disclosure or 
transfer of information alone does not constitute a remediable harm 
and even if such harm exists, it rarely amounts to a diminishment of 
the quality or value of a materially valuable interest in personal 
information.150 
In certain areas cloud service providers have to adhere to special 
disclosure requirements. For example, cloud service providers that 
offer “video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials” are 
arguably subject to the Video Privacy Protection Act, which generally 
prevents them from knowingly disclosing PII concerning their 
customers.151 This obligation is especially relevant as it also extends 
beyond the immediate providers of audio visual materials.152 For book 
service providers, California’s Reader Privacy Act limits the 
disclosure of a user’s personal information as well.153 However, 
information can be disclosed if the user has given “informed, 
affirmative consent to the specific disclosure for a particular 
purpose.”154 If health care providers and other covered entities under 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
provide cloud services, they will be often limited in disclosing and 
using patients’ information.155 The same is also true for financial 
information collected by financial institutions or other processors of 
financial information.156 
2. Disclosure to the Government 
The disclosure of user information to the government is 
contingent on the user’s constitutional privacy rights, particularly, the 
 
 149. See In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 328-29 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2011); Class Action Complaint at 46, Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 
696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. C08 03845 RS), 2008 WL 3886402, para. 131. 
 152. See § 2710(a)(4), (b)(2)(D)-(E) (2011). 
 153. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.90-1798.90.05 (West 2012). 
 154. See id. § 1798.90(c)(3). 
 155. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502-.514 (2012). Beyond HIPAA further federal and state 
statutes govern the disclosure of health information. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2011). 
 156. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 
(relevant sections codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2011)), and the 
implementation of its Privacy Rule and Safeguards Rule, in 16 C.F.R. pts. 313 and 314 (2012), 
respectively. 
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Fourth Amendment and possibly the right to information privacy. 
Beginning with the Fourth Amendment, whether its protection from 
governmental searches and seizures is applicable depends on the 
“reasonable expectations of privacy” test of Katz v. United States.157 
In the context of cloud computing, the reasonable expectation of 
privacy is limited by the third-party doctrine.158 This doctrine was 
developed in United States v. Miller, where the Supreme Court 
reasoned that voluntary revelation of information to a third party can 
justify an assumption of risk that the third party will disclose the 
revealed information to the government, which would counter a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.159 However, a reasonable 
expectation of privacy can still exist in cases where contents of a 
communication are revealed to a third party. Smith v. Maryland stands 
for the proposition that Fourth Amendment protection can continue to 
apply with regard to the contents of a communication because in this 
case a reasonable expectation of privacy is more likely to exist than 
for noncontent information.160 While this distinction between contents 
of communication and noncontent information is subject to 
criticism,161 it remains an essential element of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.162 
 
 157. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See 
also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 215 
(1890) (“There are persons who may reasonably claim as a right, protection from the notoriety 
entailed by being made the victims of journalistic enterprise.” (emphasis added)). 
 158. See, e.g., Constantine, supra note 109, at 513; Kattan, supra note 123, at 625; 
Robison, supra note 123, at 1226; Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1135 (2002). 
 159. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to 
a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities . . . .”). See also Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (“[A] person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). 
 160. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (“Yet a pen register differs significantly from the listening 
device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (doubting that there is a clear 
distinction between content and noncontent); David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: 
Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2237 (2009) (“But while calendars, photo albums, and the like are more 
clearly content data as opposed to transactional, other types of data are less clear.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1029 (2010) (“The Fourth Amendment should generally 
protect the contents of communications stored in ‘the cloud’ of the Internet . . . .”); Tene, supra 
note 54, at 1471 (“Hence, Fourth Amendment protection continues to apply insofar as 
personally identifiable information held by a third party includes the ‘contents’ of a 
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Because of the third party doctrine, a cloud service user may 
only have a limited expectation of privacy in certain instances.163 For 
example, a user may be held to have relinquished a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in search queries upon submitting them to the 
search engine provider.164 In such case the user is deemed to have 
voluntarily turned over information to a third party and is therefore 
only entitled to limited Fourth Amendment protection.165 Only to the 
extent that search queries and other collected information can be 
characterized as contents of a communication, constitutional 
protection can be reasserted under the Smith exception.166 In this 
regard, for instance, the body of an email message qualifies as 
communication contents.167 In general, in order to determine the 
scope of protection for a particular piece of information, it must be 
determined whether that piece of information is contents of a 
communication or noncontent information. As described for the SCA 
and Wiretap Act, information is contents of a communication if it is 
part of a substantive message that a person wishes to communicate, 
while delivery or processing information will usually not be 
considered contents of a communication.168 
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, to a limited extent, cloud 
service providers could be subject to a right to information privacy as 
well. The Supreme Court mentioned the right to information privacy 
in Whalen v. Roe.169 It is not clear, however, whether the Constitution 
 
communication.”). 
 163. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 512 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that email 
and IP addresses do not receive Fourth Amendment protection); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 
336 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding that users cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
bulletin board subscriber information); Foley, supra note 127, at 457. 
 164. Tene, supra note 54, at 1472. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“It follows that 
email requires strong protection under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”); Forrester, 512 F.3d at 
512 (holding that the contents of emails may receive Fourth Amendment protection); Warshak 
v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “individuals maintain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a 
commercial [Internet service provider]”), vacated en banc, No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417-19 (C.A.A.F. 1996) 
(holding that emails may be protected under the Fourth Amendment). 
 168. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 169. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977) (acknowledging an “individual 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”). See also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 
433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) (holding that President Nixon “has a legitimate expectation of privacy 
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can be interpreted to contain such right. While some courts held so,170 
others expressed doubts.171 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court 
avoided to take a stand.172 Assuming that the right can be derived 
from the Constitution, it would protect the “individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”173 This protection could 
become especially relevant as the third party doctrine is arguably not 
applicable to the right to information privacy.174 However, the right 
only protects from “hav[ing] an individual’s private affairs made 
public by the government.”175 Thus, it only applies to governmental 
cloud service providers or to private providers if they act as an agent 
of the government.176 Given the existence and applicability of the 
 
in his personal communications”); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 
578 (3d Cir. 1980) (establishing a seven factor test for determining whether the right to 
information privacy is violated). 
 170. See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the right to 
informational privacy is not absolute, but rather to be weighed with governmental interests) 
(quoting Doe v. Att’y Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991)); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 
F.2d at 578. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 
BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 653 (2007) (stating that “there is a strong argument that the Constitution 
should be interpreted to protect a right to control information”). 
 171. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 
793 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (refraining from ruling whether a right to information privacy exists); J.P. 
v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (concluding that the Federal Constitution does 
not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information). See also Strahilevitz, 
supra note 93, at 2048 (arguing that “it would be best to end the constitutional right to 
information privacy experiment” or relegate it to a gap-filling function). 
 172. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) (“We 
assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in 
Whalen and Nixon.”). 
 173. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-
600; Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 578 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600). 
 174. Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1031 n.7 
(9th Cir. 2009) (Wardlaw, J., concurring) (citing Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. 
(Nelson I), 530 F.3d 865, 880 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011)), 
rev’d and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011); Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 880 n.5. But see Nelson II, 
568 F.3d at 1044 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the interpretation of the right to 
informational privacy is “informed by Supreme Court case law interpreting an expectation of 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment”); Strahilevitz, supra note 93, at 2043 (arguing in favor of 
Judge Callahan’s dissent). 
 175. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 577 (emphasis added). See also Nelson I, 530 
F.3d at 877 (stating that the “government’s actions [that] compel disclosure of private 
information” must advance a legitimate state interest and be narrowly tailored to be justified 
(emphasis added)). 
 176. For a private person to be considered an agent of the government under the state 
action doctrine, two factors are determinative: (1) whether the government knew of and 
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the private actor’s purpose was to assist law 
enforcement efforts rather than to further its own ends. See, e.g., United States v. Steiger, 318 
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right to information privacy, the lawfulness of the information 
disclosure would depend on the seven-factor test established by 
United States v. Westinghouse.177 
In contrast to the Federal Constitution, many state constitutions 
protect privacy in the form of a right to information privacy 
unequivocally.178 One example is the right to information privacy 
found in the California Constitution.179 Going beyond the Federal 
Constitution’s information privacy right interpretation, California’s 
constitutional privacy right “protects individuals from the invasion of 
their privacy not only by state actors, but also by private parties.”180 
Thus, the Californian information privacy right’s applicability is 
broader than the possible right under the Federal Constitution. 
However, its scope of privacy protection is actually smaller. This is 
because in order to prove a claim under California’s constitutional 
privacy right, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: “(1) a 
legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of 
privacy under the circumstances; (3) and conduct by the defendant 
that amounts to a serious invasion of the protected privacy interest,” 
 
F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 
1990)). See also Volokh, supra note 6, at 85 (“The Constitution says little about what private 
persons or businesses may or may not do . . . .”). 
 177. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 578 (holding that the right to information 
privacy is dependent (1) on the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or might 
contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury 
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of 
safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7) whether 
there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public 
interest militating toward access). 
 178. See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994) (en 
banc) (holding that the privacy provision of the California Constitution encompasses 
informational privacy); Berkeley v. Eisen, 699 So. 2d 789, 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that the names, addresses, and phone numbers of investors were protected from public 
disclosure under Florida’s constitutional privacy right); McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, 
799 P.2d 953, 957 (Haw. 1990) (holding that Hawaii’s constitutional right of privacy protects 
the individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters); State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 
441, 448 (Mont. 1997) (holding that Montana’s constitutional privacy right encompasses 
informational privacy). For a comprehensive overview of explicit state constitutional privacy 
protections see Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/privacy-protections-in-state-
constitutions.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). 
 179. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 180. See, e.g., Leonel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 702, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2005); In re 
iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Am. Acad. of 
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997)); Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop 
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 546 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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that is, an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy 
right.181 In particular, the third element will often limit the scope of 
privacy protection of cloud service users. For example, the disclosure 
of unique device identifier numbers, personal information, and 
location information does not amount to an egregious breach of social 
norms.182 
Below the constitutional level, the disclosure of information to 
the government is generally regulated by the same laws as the 
disclosure to private parties.183 Some laws, however, already reflect 
the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protection by providing special 
rules for the disclosure of information to the government.184 For 
example, the provisions of the SCA implement the Fourth 
Amendment.185 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 regulates compelled 
information disclosure by electronic communication and remote 
computing service providers. In this regard, every compelled 
information disclosure is an information disclosure to the 
government.186 Reflecting the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 18 
U.S.C. § 2703 distinguishes between disclosure of contents of 
communication and noncontent information. On the one hand, the 
compelled disclosure of contents of communications is subject to 
strict requirements. Specifically, such disclosure can be based on a 
 
 181. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (citing Hill, 865 P.2d at 654-
55). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 184. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703, 2710(b)(2)(C), 2710(b)(3) (2011). See also CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.90(c)(1)-(2) (West 2012). All laws must be construed in light of the constitutional 
privacy rights, independently of whether those rights are already explicitly reflected in the 
language of the laws or not. See, e.g., Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 550 (Ct. App. 
1986) (holding that “[a]ny incursion into the protected interest should be construed, if possible, 
to preserve the privacy interest, and so that the statute is not applied in an unconstitutional 
manner”). 
 185. See Andrew C. DeVore, Cloud Computing: Privacy Storm on the Horizon?, 20 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 365, 371 (2010) (explaining that Congress passed the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act “to approximate Fourth Amendment and other protections for 
electronic communications and other information stored electronically”); Kerr, supra note 83, at 
1212 (noting that the statute creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections). But 
see Tene, supra note 54, at 1481 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy test is only insufficiently reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 2703). 
 186. However, not every information disclosure to the government may be a compelled 
information disclosure. In this regard, it is a difficult task to draw the distinction between 
compelled and voluntary information disclosure. See Kerr, supra note 83, at 1224-27. 
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warrant,187 which, in case of disclosure by an electronic 
communication service provider of information in storage for one 
hundred and eighty days or less, is even required,188 a subpoena 
combined with prior notice to the subscriber or customer,189 or a court 
order combined with such notice.190 On the other hand, noncontent 
information is less protected by the Fourth Amendment and, 
consequently, subject to less strict disclosure requirements.191 
C. Information Use 
Information use covers the various ways of aggregating and 
analyzing information for a particular purpose. Information 
aggregation and analysis can serve many different purposes. Relevant 
purposes for cloud service providers are, for example, provision, 
maintenance, and improvement of services and advertisements. In 
order to analyze the information, providers can leverage computer 
scientific methods, such as data mining, as well as statistical and 
mathematical methods.192 Information aggregation, in form of online 
profiling or data enhancement, is often a prerequisite for the analysis 
of information and is mainly governed by unfair competition laws. 
The remainder of this section will address information aggregation. 
Information aggregation is the process of connecting 
information.193 While it is based on the collection of information, it 
goes further because it systematically connects information. For 
example, an aggregation can refer to all information associated with a 
particular user of a cloud service. Thus, aggregated information can 
be used for purposes of personalization of cloud services or 
behavioral advertising.194 For services that do not require users to 
authenticate themselves, information can be aggregated based on IP 
 
 187. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A) (2011). 
 188. Id. § 2703(a). 
 189. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 190. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii), (d). 
 191. Id. § 2703(c). 
 192. See Tene, supra note 54, at 1450-51 (noting that search engine providers can refine 
search quality and build new services by analyzing search query logs). 
 193. See Solove, supra note 74, at 490 (“Aggregation involves the combination of various 
pieces of data about a person.”). 
 194. Eve Chaurand-Fraser, Current Events in Search Data Collection and Retention, 970 
PLI/PAT 609, 612 (2009). See generally Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search 
Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
1149, 1186-88 (2008) (describing search engine personalization). 
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addresses or cookie IDs, which are identifiers that can be associated 
with particular computers or browsers, respectively.195 
The lawfulness of information aggregation depends on whether it 
is limited to information that the cloud service provider collected 
itself or involves information collected via third parties. If the cloud 
service provider only aggregates information that it collected itself, 
such practice is generally permitted without user consent.196 The FTC 
published guidelines for aggregating consumer information.197 
According to those guidelines, the aggregation of information from 
consumer-to-business transfers of information generally does not 
require consent by the consumer.198 However, a cloud service 
provider may need to obtain consent when tracking a consumer across 
multiple of its services.199 
If any information to be aggregated is collected via third parties, 
consent will often be required. This is especially true for third party 
tracking, that is, following a consumer across third party websites.200 
In case of a business-to-business transfer of consumer information, it 
must be distinguished between receiving and disclosing 
information.201 If a cloud service provider receives consumer 
information in order to aggregate it with information it already 
collected itself, the FTC does not require consent of the consumer.202 
However, if a cloud service provider with a direct consumer 
relationship discloses information to a third party, the consent of the 
consumer is required.203 
D. Information Management 
Information management refers to the maintenance of 
information and is primarily governed by unfair competition laws. In 
 
 195. Goldberg, supra note 119, at 253. 
 196. Cf. Tracy A. Steindel, Note, A Path Toward User Control of Online Profiling, 17 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 459, 460 (2011) (“Congress has not passed any relevant 
legislation, and courts have proven unwilling to read existing legislation to prohibit or limit 
online profiling.”). See generally In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 197. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 68, at 42-46. 
 198. Id. at 44. 
 199. Id. at 41-42. 
 200. Id. at 40-41. 
 201. Id. at 44. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
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this regard, the FTC requires cloud service providers to develop and 
implement a comprehensive privacy and security program subject to 
an independent third party audit.204 Thus, the remainder of this section 
will focus on the details of such program, that is, providers’ 
obligations to develop and implement measures for controlling access 
to information as well as for retention, disposal, storage, and 
transmission of information. Furthermore, the extensive state 
legislation in the area of information breach notification will be 
addressed as well. 
With regard to controlling information access, cloud service 
providers are required to employ reasonable and appropriate measures 
to protect personal information against unauthorized access.205 This 
involves employing an intrusion detection system, monitoring system 
logs, restricting connections to specified IP addresses or granting 
temporary, limited access, monitoring and filtering outbound traffic 
from the provider’s networks to identify, and block export of sensitive 
information without authorization.206 Cloud service providers are also 
required to develop reasonable policies and procedures to verify or 
authenticate the identities and qualifications of users and identify 
unauthorized user activity.207 
There is no fixed retention period for information. The FTC, 
however, charged various companies under the FTC Act for retaining 
credit card information longer than they had a business need to do 
so.208 Thus, service providers must generally dispose of information if 
there is no longer a business need to retain it.209 This remains true 
 
 204. See, e.g., Decision and Order at 5-7, Facebook, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4365 (July 
27, 2012); Decision and Order at 4-5, Google, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011). 
 205. See, e.g., Decision and Order at 3, CVS Caremark Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4259 
(June 18, 2009); Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 18-19, FTC v. 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., Civ. No. 2:12-cv-01365-SPL, 2012 WL 2389423 (D. Ariz. June 
26, 2012); Complaint at 3-5, Franklin’s Budget Car Sales, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4371 (Oct. 3, 
2012) (alleging misrepresentations about the implementation of reasonable and appropriate 
measures to protect consumers’ personal information from unauthorized access as well as 
violations of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 314, and Privacy 
Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 313, which were applicable to the respondent as it was characterized as a 
financial institution). 
 206. Complaint at 2, Dave & Buster’s, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4291 (May 20, 2010). 
 207. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief at 6-
9, United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., No. 1:06-CV-00198-GET (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2006). 
 208. See, e.g., Decision and Order at 2, DSW Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4157 (Mar. 7, 
2006); Complaint at 2-3, BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4148 (Sept. 20, 2005). 
 209. See also 16 C.F.R. § 312.10 (2012) (prescribing that personal information collected 
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even if laws provide for disclosure of information to the government. 
For example, while the SCA provides that the government can 
compel disclosure of certain information for a potentially infinite 
time,210 the service provider is not obligated to retain information for 
the government beyond its business purposes. Rather, it is the 
responsibility of the government to make a request early enough, 
when the information is still retained for business purposes. Upon 
such request, however, it is the provider’s obligation to preserve the 
pertinent information for the government.211 
When it is no longer necessary to retain information, cloud 
service providers must dispose of the information in a manner that 
preserves privacy.212 Many states have statutes that require covered 
cloud service providers to dispose of personal information safely and 
securely.213 For example, California requires businesses to take 
reasonable steps to dispose, or arrange for the disposal, of customer 
records within its custody or control containing personal information 
when the records are no longer to be retained by the business by (1) 
shredding, (2) erasing, or (3) otherwise modifying the personal 
information in those records to make it unreadable or undecipherable 
through any means.214 
In certain cases, cloud service providers must have encryption 
for storage and transmission of information.215 Particularly, it is 
insufficient to store debit and credit card information in unencrypted 
files that could be easily accessed by using a commonly known user 
ID and password.216 Further, it is unlawful to transmit debit and credit 
card information, financial account numbers, security codes and 
 
online from a child should only be retained “as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the 
purpose for which the information was collected.”). 
 210. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)-(b) (2011). 
 211. Id. § 2703(f). 
 212. See, e.g., Decision and Order at 2, CVS Caremark Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4259 
(June 18, 2009); Complaint at 2-3, Rite Aid Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4308 (Nov. 12, 2010). 
 213. For a comprehensive overview of state information disposal statutes, see SOLOVE & 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 142-43. In addition, the Disposal Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 682 (2011), is 
applicable to cloud service providers that hold information from consumer reports. 
 214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 (West 2012). 
 215. See, e.g., Complaint at 2-3, DSW Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4157 (Mar. 7, 2006); 
Complaint at 2-3, BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4148 (Sept. 20, 2005). Some 
state laws require the encryption of information in certain cases as well. See, e.g., NEV. REV. 
STAT. §603A.215(2), (5) (2011), 201 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.04(3), (5) (2013). 
 216. Complaint at 2, DSW Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4157; Complaint at 2-3, BJ’s 
Wholesale Club, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4148. 
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expiration dates, and Social Security numbers entered into web forms 
over the Internet unencrypted and in clear text.217 In some instances, 
the FTC even required to encrypt or otherwise protect user 
credentials, search queries, and search results in transit between users 
and cloud service providers.218 
If a data security breach happens, cloud service providers must 
notify affected users.219A large majority of states have data security 
breach notification statutes.220 Some of these statutes have subtle and 
noteworthy differences. For example, California’s data security 
breach notification statute requires the disclosure of any actual or 
reasonably suspected security breach concerning unencrypted 
personal information.221 However, New York’s data security breach 
notification statute can cover encrypted data as well if an encryption 
key has also been acquired.222 If cloud service providers want to avoid 
multi-state notifications, they could alternatively adhere to the 
strictest state statute, which will act as a de facto federal standard. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Cloud computing is not a new phenomenon and covers many 
web applications and other network services that already existed 
before the term “cloud computing” was coined. In fact, even before 
the trend of moving software and information to the desktop emerged 
in the 1990s, many information processing tasks were performed via 
the cloud.223 Therefore, a lot of the legal considerations, for example, 
the various applications of the SCA, are not new either. While not a 
perfect fit in every detail, on a structural level the privacy law of 
 
 217. Complaint at 3, Upromise, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4351 (Mar. 27, 2012). 
 218. Complaint at 4, Reed Elsevier Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4226 (July 29, 2008). 
 219. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security 
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (California’s 
“Shine the Light” law, which requires businesses to notify customers about the disclosure of 
personal information to third parties independently of any data security breach). 
 220. For a comprehensive overview of data security breach notification statutes see 
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 136-40. 
 221. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a). 
 222. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(b) (McKinney 2012). 
 223. See, e.g., Armbrust et al., supra note 2, at 50 (quoting Oracle’s CEO Larry Ellison, 
with the statement that “[t]he interesting thing about cloud computing is that we’ve redefined 
cloud computing to include everything that we already do . . . . I don’t understand what we 
would do differently in the light of cloud computing other than change the wording of some of 
our ads.” (alteration in original)). 
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cloud computing can be soundly and coherently interpreted. Most 
importantly, it is characterized first by the autonomy of the service 
providers and users entering into privacy contracts and secondly by a 
set of secondary privacy laws as a default. As it should be, the law is 
guided by “autonomous individuals who are able to negotiate freely 
and equally for the right level of privacy.”224 
Based on these characteristics the law allows for development of 
a privacy marketplace, where both the personal and commercial 
dimensions of the privacy right can be individually adapted.225 For 
example, in exchange for free services, users can authorize service 
providers to collect, disclose, and use their information for contextual 
and targeted advertising.226 In this regard, it is left to the users how 
strongly they want to monetize their privacy rights and how much 
privacy they want to retain. On the other side, cloud service providers 
are enabled to offer new services and generate revenue from the 
information they collect.227 They can obtain rights in information 
uploaded to the cloud in exchange for providing access to free-of-
charge services.228 In this regard, the privacy law of cloud computing 
promotes free markets and innovation serving as a blueprint for the 
American information privacy regime. 
 
 224. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1682 (1999). 
 225. See generally Christopher Riederer et al., For Sale: Your Data, By: You, in 
HOTNETS-X PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH ACM WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS IN NETWORKS 1 
(2011), available at http://conferences.sigcomm.org/hotnets/2011/papers/hotnetsX-final85.pdf. 
 226. Robison, supra note 123, at 1196. 
 227. Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging of 
Personally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 641 (2008). 
 228. Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 29, at 78. 
